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Abstract
In practical crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, posted pricing is widely used
due to its simplicity, where a task requester publishes a pricing rule a priori, on which workers decide
whether to accept and perform the task or not, and are often paid according to the quality of their effort.
One of the key ingredients of a good posted pricing lies in how to recruit more high-quality workers with
less budget, for which the following two schemes are considered: (i) personalized pricing by profiling
users in terms of their quality and cost, and (ii) additional bonus payment offered for more qualified
task completion. Despite their potential benefits in crowdsourced pricing, it has been under-explored
how much gain each or both of personalization and bonus payment actually provides to the requester.
In this paper, we study four possible combinations of posted pricing made by pricing with/without
personalization and bonus. We aim at analytically quantifying when and how much such two ideas
contribute to the requester’s utility. To this end, we first derive the optimal personalized and common
pricing schemes and analyze their computational tractability. Next, we quantify the gap in the utility
between with and without bonus payment in both pricing schemes. We analytically prove that the impact
of bonus is negligible in personalized pricing, whereas crucial in common pricing. Finally, we study the
notion of Price of Agnosticity (PoA) that quantifies the utility gap between personalized and common
pricing policies, where we show that PoA is not significant under many practical conditions. This implies
that a complex personalized pricing with more privacy concerns can be replaced by a simple common
pricing with bonus, if designed well. We validate our analytical findings through extensive simulations
and real experiments done in Amazon Mechanical Turk, and provide additional implications that are
useful in designing a pricing policy in crowdsourcing.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Crowdsourcing system is a popular tool to solve problems which involve huge dataset but can be decomposed
into simple tasks, where the tasks are electronically distributed to numerous workers who are willing to
perform the tasks at low cost. It is useful, in particular, when the tasks, e.g., image classifications, are
easy for human but hard for computer. People have paid much attentions to the following two directions
in crowdsourcing: (i) post-processing dataset and (ii) worker quality control . In (i), once a task is given to
workers, since payment is typically low and tasks are tedious, error is common even among those who are
willing. This is further complicated by abundant spammers trying to make easy money with little effort.
To handle this, the requester adds redundancy by assigning the same task to multiple workers, and from
these redundant answer data set, some nice statistical inference techniques such as majority voting or belief
propagation are applied to infer the correct answer to the task, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4]. However, there should be
unavoidable limitations in terms of guaranteeing a target precision when workers inputs are highly erroneous
[5, 6]. In (ii), it would be highly beneficial to recruit as many high-quality workers as possible, which is
possible by incentivizing workers to produce qualified output, see e.g., [7, 8]. In crowdsourcing, workers get
paid as a reward of effort on submitting answers. Many experiments reveal that not only the quantity of
∗Suho Shin, Hoyong Choi, and Yung Yi are with the Department of Electrical Engineering at Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea (e-mail: {shinas327, chy0707, yiyung}@kaist.ac.kr). Jungseul Ok is with the
Department of Electrical Engineering at KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden (e-mail: ockjs1@gmail.com).
i
users’ labels [9, 10], but also the quality of their labels significantly improve [11, 12, 13], if the payment for
incentivization is properly designed. There exist many researches on efficient mechanism design for pricing
in crowdsourcing, ranging from sealed bid auction to posted pricing (see more details in Section 1.3).
Out of many pricing mechanisms, practical crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
popularly use posted pricing due to its simplicity and convenience to workers, where a task requester publishes
a pricing rule a priori, based on which each worker decides on the task acceptance and its completion. As
in other pricing mechanisms, in posted pricing, recruiting and discouraging high-quality and low-quality
workers, respectively, is the key, for which the following two ideas are natural: (i) personalized pricing by
offering individual price to each worker based on her quality and cost and (ii) giving additional bonus (in
addition to base payment just for participation) to workers with more qualified task completion. However, it
has been largely under-explored how much gain each or both of personalization and bonus actually provides
to the task requester.
1.2 Main Contribution
Personalized pricing (PP) that individually treats workers based on their cost and quality profiles obviously
seems superior to the pricing without personalization, referred to as common pricing (CP) in this paper,
which offers a uniform pricing to the entire workers. However, PP is obviously more complex and more
privacy-vulnerable, especially for the tasks with a large number of workers. A simple option of giving bonus
for more qualified workers in both PP and CP should provide more power of controlling workers’ behaviors, so
as to help in increasing the requester’s utility. In this paper, we essentially consider four possible combinations
of posted pricing made by personalized/common pricing and those with/without bonus payment, from which
we quantify when and how much personalization and bonus payment contribute to the requester’s utility.
We summarize our main contributions in what follows:
◦ Optimal personalized pricing. In Section 3, we first derive the optimal pricing schemes (or their
structures) in PP and CP. In PP, we prove that computing an optimal scheme is equivalent to solving
the generalized 0-1 knapsack problem (GKP), which is known to be NP-hard. Using their equivalence,
it is possible to inherit the approximation algorithms in GKP, which were developed under some special
conditions of the objective utility function in literature, and we apply them to develop an approximation
algorithm in designing an efficient scheme in PP. However, our investigation of the utility functions from
popular crowdsourcing tasks in practice motivates us to study the unexplored conditions in literature:
subadditivity and Schur-convexity. Under these conditions, we prove that a greedy-type algorithm achieves
1/2-factor approximation of the optimal PP, which can also be applied to GKP with a slight modification.
◦ Optimal common pricing. In Section 4, we characterize the structure of the optimal way of pricing
in CP. To this end, we assume a certain relation between workers’ cost and quality, motivated by our
empirical study in Section 7.2. This relation is divided into three regimes: effort-unresponsive, effort-
subresponsive, and effort-responsive, depending on how workers’ quality grows with increasing effort. For
all three regimes, we prove that the optimal pricing schemes are highly structured, which is crucial to
develop three polynomial-time algorithms, being in sharp contrast to PP. The time complexities are at
most O(B(n)n log n), where B(n) is the pricing budget that may scale with the number of workers n.
◦ Power of bonus and PoA (Price of Agnosticity). Using the optimal pricing results of PP and
CP in Sections 3 and 4, in Section 5, we first prove that bonus is a marginal device in the optimal PP,
whereas it is of significant importance in the optimal CP. This is intuitive because personalization has
sufficient power to control workers’ behavior in PP, but bonus may be the only way to differentiate high
and low-quality workers in CP. Next, we draw an interesting result that CP with bonus is comparable
to PP by quantifying the notion of Price-of-Agnosticity (PoA) that is the utility gap between the optimal
PP and CP schemes. This is somewhat surprising because a simple way of unified (base, bonus) payments
is practically enough to achieve a comparable performance to personalized pricing. This enables task
requesters to ensure that a simple pricing such as common pricing, if properly designed, is able to provide
a large amount utility.
◦ Implications from simulation and real experiment. To validate our analytical findings, we provide
extensive simulation results, and perform various experiments on a real-world platform, Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk. Especially, from our real experiment reveals the significant importance of bonus in common
pricing, where without bonus, workers do not take the task even with excessive base payment offered,
ii
Table 1: Related work: CS (CrowdSourcing)
Major CS app. Model Paper
Contest All-pay auction [14, 15, 16, 17]
Ecommerce Sealed-bid auction [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
Microtask Posted price [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]
Microtask Misc. [30, 31, 32, 33]
whereas with only small bonus, workers invest a large amount of effort of performing given tasks. This
has a good match with our theoretical result on the impact of bonus. Furthermore, we derive other useful
implications, in particular, on efficient pricing policies that deliver quick and qualified responses from
workers.
1.3 Related Work
Posted Pricing. Deriving the optimal pricing becomes the problem of solving the knapsack optimization
problem for which the following prior work exists. The authors in [24, 25] suggest approximation algorithms
in the bayesian setting, assuming (a) the complete knowledge of the probability distribution of each worker’s
cost and quality, and (b) submodularity or additivity of the utility function. The authors in [27] consider
the problem which is dual to [24], wherein with a given utility constraint the objective is to minimize the
cost. The authors in [23] study the posted pricing in a large market setting where the cost of a single
worker is very small compared to the budget. In [34], it is revealed that the online cloud resource problem
can be expressed nicely by a posted pricing mechanism, showing its equivalence to a variant of an online
knapsack problem and proposing an optimal posted pricing mechanism in terms of the competitive ratio.
Other types of on-line setting for posted pricing have been studied, where the requester gradually adapts to
heterogeneous worker qualities or task difficulties. In [35], the authors consider online worker arrivals with
the objective of maximizing the number of solved tasks. The authors in [26, 28] study this problem in the
context of posted pricing for online procurement auction. They again assume online arrivals of heterogeneous
workers and formulate a problem in the multi-armed bandit framework, providing an analysis of UCB (Upper
Confidence Bound) algorithm. The authors in [29] study a similar problem, but for homogeneous workers
and heterogeneous tasks.
Auction-based pricing. All-pay auction has been studied as a good pricing [16, 15, 14, 22, 36] in
crowdsourcing, where all workers obligatorily pay their bids (i.e., efforts) regardless of the allocated items,
and then get paid from the task requester based on their efforts. They propose the algorithms with a
certain approximation ratio of various bidding strategies, for different forms of revenue functions, especially
in crowdsourcing contests. Another mechanism is the sealed-bid auction, where each worker first submits her
bid for a set of tasks and the amount of charge she claims for performing such a set of tasks. Since the real
world crowdsourcing system is not operated in such a one-shot manner, they fill such a gap using the concept
of repetition of sealed-bid auctions. The requester tries to appropriately profile the task difficulties and worker
qualities in an adaptive manner to maximize their revenue under the budget constraint, e.g., [22, 21, 20, 18].
To avoid the computational intractability of an optimal winning bid allocation for maximizing the utility,
they suggest a greedy-style algorithm mechanism, and prove its truthfulness, individual rationality, and
budget feasibility. The authors in [19] consider the hardness in the verification of submitted quality and
propose a cost-effective mechanism with guaranteed symmetric Nash Equilibrium.
Bonus. There exists an array of prior work which studies bonus in various pricing scenarios. The authors in
[37, 38] conduct a massive real-world experiment to measure the performance of various pricing mechanisms
with bonus. In [30, 31], the problem of designing a crowdsourcing platform has been studied, assuming
that workers try to align their output, and the authors analyze an equilibrium of the system regarding the
proposed incentivizing algorithms. The authors in [32, 33] redefine the concept of incentive-compatibility,
and propose an axiomatic approach to find an incentive-compatible mechanism.
iii
2 Model
We consider a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n workers, where n is the number of workers who are eligible to
perform a target task given a certain time deadline. Each worker i ∈ N is associated with a profile (ri, ci)
if she can produce the output of (expected) quality ri ∈ [0, 1] at cost ci ≥ 0. In the worker i’s profile,
quality ri corresponds to the expected individual contribution to the task and cost ci corresponds to the
opportunity cost of the time to perform the task. The task is associated with a utility, which corresponds to
the satisfaction given to the task requester and is a function of the expected contributions {rixi}i∈N from
workers, where we denote xi = 1 if worker i participate the task and xi = 0 otherwise. More formally,
we associate the task with the utility function U(r ◦ x) for some U : [0, 1]n → R, where r := {ri}i∈N ,
x := {xi}i∈N and ◦ is the element-wise product of two sequences of the same length, i.e., r ◦x = {rixi}i∈N .
We assume U is symmetric1 and non-decreasing2. This assumption means that worker’s contribution is
equally and always welcome.
Example: Typo correction task. Consider a typo correction task with M hidden typos, where a natural
utility function is the number of expected typos corrected by at least one worker. Let si be the probability
of worker i of correcting a single typo independently. If the requester has some fixed number m ≤ M and
regards the quality ri as the probability of correcting at least m typos, the mapping between si and ri is
such that ri = bm(si) with invertible function bm(s) :=
∑M
k=m
(
M
k
)
sk(1− s)M−k on [0, 1]. Thus, we have the
following utility function:
U(r ◦ x) =M ·
(
1−
∏
i∈N
(
1− b−1m (rixi)
))
, (1)
where 1−b−1m (rixi) is the probability that worker i fails to find and correct a single typo. Then, we can easily
see that the above utility function is symmetric and non-decreasing, with increasing b−1m (r) and b
−1
m (0) = 0.
We also present other examples of utility functions in appendix.
Pricing policy with bonus. We consider a posted pricing scheme to recruit workers, where a fixed pricing
policy is posted before workers perform the task, while the pricing policy may depend on a given worker profile
{(ri, ci)}i∈N . We particularly consider pricing policies with bonus, where bonus payment is additionally paid
to workers who accomplish good-quality output. To formalize, we denote it by π := {(pi, qi)}i∈N , where
each worker i is paid pi ≥ 0 dollars as a base payment for participation, and at most qi ≥ 0 dollars as a
bonus payment proportional to the quality of her contribution. Hence, quality ri can be interpreted as the
normalized expectation of bonus payment. We note that the pricing policy includes the worker qualification
and thus the definition of quality or individual contribution, which often play a crucial role in designing a
pricing policy.
Worker behavior. Under the belief that the requester has a mechanism to perfectly evaluate each worker’s
contribution3, and each worker i knows her own profile (ri, ci) with her payoff (pi + qiri − ci) × xi. We
assume rational workers each of whom strategically maximizes her individual expected payoff, for given
pricing policy. More formally, for given π, the strategic decision of worker i is denoted by φi(pi, qi):
φi(pi, qi) := 1[pi + qiri ≥ ci],
4 (2)
where 1[A] is the indicator function of A such that 1[A] = 1 if A is true, and 1[A] = 0 otherwise. We stress
that the choice of quality indeed changes each worker’s decision. For example, recall the typo correction
example, where each worker i has the probability to correct a typo at si, while quality ri depends on the
definition of qualified worker, i.e., ri is a function of the minimum number m of typo corrections required for
bonus qi. Hence, even for the same value of qi and the same set of workers, the set of participating workers
can change depending on the definition of quality.
1A function U is symmetric, when for all a, b ∈ Rn, U(a) = U(b) if there exists an ordering j(1), ..., j(n) such that ai = bj(i)
for each i ∈ N .
2A function U is non-decreasing, when for all a, b ∈ Rn, U(a) ≥ U(b) if ai ≥ bi for each i ∈ N .
3This becomes possible in practice, by aggregating all workers’ answers and run some inference algorithms introduced in
Section 1.3, whose inference accuracy increase as we have more redundancy, i.e., large n.
4Mathematically, it is a two-stage sequential game, where the leader is the task requester, and the followers are workers,
where [xi(pii)]i∈N is the strategies of workers at the (Nash) equilibrium.
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Personalized pricing and common pricing. We classify post pricing policies into two groups: per-
sonalized pricing (PP) policies, and common pricing (CP) policies, depending on whether policy provides
personalized pricing for each worker, or not. Mathematically, since a CP policy {(pi, qi)}i∈N decides every
worker’s payment using a common policy, it can be simplified into a single pair (p, q) of base and bonus
payments where pi = p and qi = q for each worker i ∈ N . Hence, the set of all CP policies is a subset of all
PP policies. Despite PP policy’s more controllability on workers’ behavior and thus more expected utility,
it seems useful to CP policy, since PP policy is often discouraged in practice, e.g., Amazon Mechanical-Turk
[39]. Also, PP policy requires more sophisticated and detailed information on worker profile, leading to
privacy concerns, whereas the CP policy needs only a summarizing property of the entire worker profiles
rather than individual ones.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Our goal is to find an optimal pricing policy pi which maximizes the task utility given worker profile
{(ri, ci)}i∈N and budget constraint B ≥ 0, i.e., the sum of expected payments to workers does not ex-
ceed B. We first define the optimal PP policy as a solution of optimal personalized pricing problem (OPP)
in the following:
OPP: maximize
{(pi,qi)}i∈N
U(r ◦ x) (3a)
subject to xi = 1[pi + qiri ≥ ci] , and (3b)∑
i∈N
(pi + qiri)xi ≤ B , (3c)
where (3b) corresponds to the assumption on the rational workers, and (3c) refers to the budget constraint
. We note that the control variables of (3) is the personalized pricing policy {(pi, qi)}i∈N .
In CP, the pricing policy is forced to be indistinguishable for all workers, while each worker i can react
differently since the expected worker utility still depends on individual profile (ri, ci). In this scenario, the
control variables {(pi, qi)}i∈N in (3a) are simplified into a single pair of base and bonus payments (p, q), and
the following optimization problem is considered:
OCP: maximize
(p,q)
U(r ◦ x) (4a)
subject to xi = 1[p+ qri ≥ ci] , and (4b)∑
i∈N
(p+ qri)xi ≤ B , (4c)
As mentioned earlier, note that the optimal PP policy outperforms the optimal CP one since the distribution
of the CP policy is agnostic on workers, while that of the PP policy discriminates workers. However, OCP
requires only partial information on worker profile, e.g., how many workers have some specific profile, whereas
OPP needs to know the individual profile (ri, ci) for each worker.
In both OPP and OCP, we have the following tensions: If the requester sets high base and low bonus, it
may fail to recruit high-quality users and utilize only low-cost users. If bonus is set too high with low base,
it should spend a huge amount of bonus on high quality users, so that the total number of recruited users
shrinks. Thus, it is necessary to strike a good balance between base and bonus payments while satisfying the
budget constraint to maximize the offered utility. This paper aims at addressing the following three main
questions:
Q1. Optimal pricing policy. What are the optimal base and bonus payments for both PP and CP
policies? Are they easy to compute, and if hard, what are the approximate algorithms and how are
their qualities?
Q2. Power of bonus. We exploit the concept of bonus in posted pricing model. Does it actually improve
the utility? How beneficial is the bonus payment in PP and CP policy?
Q3. Price of Agnosticity. How much utility does the requester lose by pricing workers in a unified manner
rather than by pricing them in a personalized manner?
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3 Optimal Personalized Pricing
We begin with considering a well-known generalized 0-1 knapsack problem, described (GKP) in the following:
GKP: maximize
x∈{0,1}n
U(r ◦ x) (5a)
subject to
n∑
i=1
cixi ≤ B . (5b)
We make the correspondence between solutions of OPP in (3) and GKP in (5), as stated in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 If {(p⋆i , q
⋆
i )}i∈N is a solution of OPP in (3), then a solution of GKP in (5) is given as
{φi(p⋆i , q
⋆
i )}i∈N in (2). Conversely, if x
⋆ is a solution of GKP in (5), then a solution of OPP in (3) is given
as {(
pix
⋆
i ,
(
ci − pi
ri
)
x⋆i
)}
i∈N
, (6)
where pi ∈ [0, ci] for each i ∈ N .
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is presented in Section 6. Note that by selecting p⋆i = cix
⋆
i in (6), we always
find an optimal PP policy with zero bonus, i.e., q⋆i = 0. This implies that the bonus in PP policy is not
mandatory since personalization in pricing is enough to control workers’ behavior without bonus payments.
However, finding such optimal PP policy is computationally intractable for a general utility function. Indeed,
it is well-known that even a special case of GKP, e.g., GKP with an additive utility, is NP-hard. Hence,
recalling the equivalence between OPP and GKP in Theorem 3.1, OPP is also NP-hard. To make the problem
tractable, we will consider utility functions U that have some structures. We first review the following notion
of majorization which compares two sequences of real numbers:
Definition 3.2 For a ∈ Rn, let a† denote the sequence with the same components, but sorted in descending
order. Given a, b ∈ Rn, we say that a weakly majorizes b and denote a ≻w b if
k∑
i=1
a†i ≥
k∑
i=1
b†i , for each k = 1, 2, ..., n . (7)
If a ≻w b and additionally
∑n
i=1 ai =
∑n
i=1 bi, we say that a majorizes b, and denote a ≻ b.
We now consider utility function U : [0, 1]n → R with either of the following conditions:
C1. U(·) is subadditive, i.e., U(a+ b) ≤ U(a)+U(b) for all a, b ∈ Rn, and Schur-convex, i.e., U(a) ≤ U(b)
for all a, b ∈ Rn such that a ≺ b.
C2. U(·) is additive, i.e., U(a+ b) = U(a) + U(b) for all a, b ∈ Rn.
Note that additivity in C2 implies subaddivity and Schur-convexity in C1, i.e., C1 is a more general
condition than C2. Considering C1 and C2 is motivated by practical tasks such as typo correction task
or labeling task. Subadditivity can be interpreted as diminishing returns of workers’ effort, which is often
observed in practice since workers produce duplicated or redundant answers. Schur-convexity captures that a
group of high-quality and low-quality workers perform no worse than a group of average-quality workers even
though those groups have the same average worker quality, since the objective is often dominated by outputs
from a few experts. Indeed, the utility function in (1) for the typo correction task with m = 1 satisfies
C1. In Appendix, we provide a proof of subadditivity and Schur-convexity of (1) for m = 1. Moreover,
changing the utility function to the expected number of typos corrected by workers leads to an additive
utility function. We remark that even the additive utility has a large set of applications such as survey or
sensing.
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Algorithm 1 ModifiedGreedy
Require: n ≥ 0, ri ∈ [0, 1], ci ≥ 0, pi ∈ [0, ci], i ∈ [n]
1: x = 0, k = 1
2: Obtain ordering j(1), ..., j(n) of N such that ηj(1) ≥ ηj(2) ≥ ... ≥ ηj(n), where ηi :=
ri
ci
, i.e., sort in the
descending order of bang-per-buck ηi.
3: while
∑k
i=1 cj(i) ≤ B do
4: xj(k) = 1
5: k ← k + 1
6: end while
7: Find m = argmaxi∈N U(r ◦ e(i)), where e(i) is the sequence such that e(i),j = 1 if j = i and e(i),j = 0
otherwise.
8: Set x⋆ = x if U(r ◦ x) > U(r ◦ e(m)), or x
⋆ = e(m) otherwise.
9: return
{(
pix
⋆
i ,
(
ci−pi
ri
)
x⋆i
)}
i∈N
3.1 Approximation Algorithm for OPP
We recall that under C1 or C2, OPP is still NP-hard, since GKP with C2 corresponds to the classical 0-1
knapsack problem, known to be NP-hard. However, it is reported that a greedy algorithm works well for the
0-1 knapsack problem with additive utility functions [40]. Inspired by this, we propose ModifiedGreedy in
Algorithm 1 for OPP. In ModifiedGreedy, we use the notion of bang-per-buck ηi := ri/ci which denotes the
ratio of quality to cost. All the workers are aligned by their values of bang-per-buck, and the top k workers
or only one worker with the highest quality is recruited. ModifiedGreedy has polynomial complexity with
respect to n and the following guarantee under C1:
Theorem 3.3 Under C1 (and thus C2), ModifiedGreedy outputs a PP policy achieving at least 12U
⋆
PP
,
where U⋆
PP
is the optimal utility value of OPP in (3).
The proof is presented in Section 6.2. We note that under the stronger condition C2, the utility function be-
comes separable. The separability in C2 provides stronger approximation guarantee using fully polynomial-
time approximation scheme (FPTAS) with approximation ratio of 1− ǫ for the knapsack problem, see, e.g.,
[41, 42]. However, under C1, the objective function is not separable. For the 0-1 knapsack problem, such
a non-separable objective makes the performance guarantee more difficult, and thus a somewhat restrictive
class of objective functions is considered in prior work, e.g., exponential functions [43], quadratic functions
[44], and submodular function with approximation ratio 1− 1/e [45, 46]. Theorem 3.3 provides a constant-
factor approximation for more general conditions of subadditivity and Schur-convexity for the 0-1 knapsack
problem. This is of broad interest to the applications which can be formulated by the 0-1 knapsack problem.
4 Optimal Common Pricing
In this section, we now study the optimal common pricing problem (OCP) in (4), that has much less freedom
in choosing the price, yet used in many practical crowdsourcing systems. Despite the dimensional reduction of
OCP, compared to OPP, we still find that solving OCP has a fundamental hardness due to the non-convex
utility function and non-convex constraint even for an additive utility function. In order to handle such
challenge in finding a global optimum in OCP, we introduce an assumption of one-to-one correspondence of
worker’s quality and cost. In detail, we assume that a quality of any worker follows a monotone increasing
mapping f : [0, 1]→ R, where ri = f(ci). Moreover, we assume that f is twice-differentiable on its domain.
This assumption is motivated by the empirical studies which reveal that according to the type of the tasks,
induced profile distribution has quite specific form [38]. Following the notion of task types used in [38], we
introduce the following regimes of workers’ profile:
Definition 4.1 We divide the class of function f into the three regimes:
◦ Effort-unresponsive. f ′(x) ≤ f(x)
x
for x ∈ [0, 1].
◦ Effort-subresponsive. f ′(x) ≥ f(x)
x
and f ′′(x) ≤ 0 for x ∈ [0, 1].
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◦ Effort-responsive. f ′(x) ≥ f(x)
x
and f ′′(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, 1].
Technically, the size of f ′(x) and f(x)
x
decides whether the bang-per-buck value, r
c
= f(c)
c
is increasing
with respect to c or not, since ∂
(
f(c)
c
)
/∂c = (cf ′(c)− f(c))/c2.
In this context, the provided regimes can be interpreted using the behavior of bang-per-buck of workers.
In effort-unresponsive regime, bang-per-buck tends to decrease as cost increases. This naturally describes
a scenario that there exists no significant improvement in worker’s quality even when cost increases. This
regime is considered to be highly practical, assuming the real world behavior of workers against tasks which
is quite trivial for many people, as will be verified in our experiments (see Section 7.2). Some instances of
task which reside in this regime include audio transcription task and handwriting recognition task [38]. In
contrary, bang-per-buck could possibly be decreasing when c is low, but it will eventually be increasing when c
becomes high. This oppositely describe the scenario of large improvement in worker’s quality with respect to
increasing cost, e.g., a task where the quality of workers largely differs with respect to invested effort. Hence
for effort-responsive regime, it is expected that high-quality workers need to be recruited. Proofreading task
and spot-the-difference task can be the examples for such a regime [38]. In effort-subresponsive regime,
bang-per-buck value possibly starts to increase as cost increases until it achieves some point, but it finally
increases with cost. Following the similar logic of the previous regime, it is expected that recruiting workers
within a medium range of quality would lead to a good pricing strategy in this regime.
4.1 Structure of Optimal Common Pricing
In OCP, our goal is to find the optimal CP policy, denoted by a sinlge pair (p⋆, q⋆) of base and bonus
payments. To this end, we first define two notions of pricing structure in CP, which facilitates the charac-
terization of the optimal pricing policy, as described shortly.
Definition 4.2 Let j(i) denote the index of worker who has i-th highest quality, i.e., rj(1) ≥ rj(2) ≥ ... ≥
rj(n).
5 Consider a CP policy π = (p, q). The policy π is said to be [ℓ, u]-picking when φj(i)(p, q) = 1 if
ℓ ≤ i ≤ u, and φj(i)(p, q) = 0 otherwise, i.e., only workers with quality between ℓ-th highest to u-th highest
values take the task. Conversely, the policy π is said to be [ℓ, u]-blocking when φj(i)(p, q) = 0 if ℓ ≤ i ≤ u,
and φj(i)(p, q) = 1 otherwise, i.e., only workers with quality between ℓ-th highest to u-th highest values decline
the task.
With the notions of [ℓ, u]-picking and [ℓ, u]-blocking in Definition 4.2, Theorem 4.3 states that under each
cost-quality regime, any pricing policy induces some special structure in recruiting workers, which further
sheds light on the structure of the optimal pricing policy for three regimes.
Theorem 4.3 Any pricing π = (p, q) in CP is [ℓ, n]-picking in effort-unresponsive regime, [ℓ, u]-blocking in
effort-responsive regime, and [ℓ, u]-picking in effort-subresponsive regime, for some ℓ and u with ℓ ≤ u ≤ n,
whose values differ under each underlying regime and depends on the pricing policy π.
We present the proof in Section 6.3. Theorem 4.3 provides characterization of pricing policies in CP for
three different cost-quality regimes. This characterization not provide an analytical closed-form, yet giving
us a useful clue on how CP policy should behave, conditioned on the relation between quality and cost.
Since such structural regularity holds for any pricing policy, an optimal pricing policy π⋆ = (p⋆, q⋆) naturally
inherits it. This result enables us to develop algorithms for computing π⋆ in polynomial time in Section 4.2.
Particularly in the effort-unresponsive regime, we are able to obtain a more detailed characterization of
the optimal CP policy, which also allows us to develop a much simpler algorithm to solve OCP, as we will
describe shortly.
4.2 Algorithms for Optimal Common Price
We now present three algorithms, each of which outputs the optimal CP for three different regimes, for which
the key ingredients are the optimal structures obtained as in Theorem 4.3. In this subsection, we focus on
providing the key ideas and the main results of three algorithms, and the full algorithms descriptions are
5For notational simplicity, we abuse the same notation j(j) here as that in ModifiedGreedy.
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provided in Appendix for the readers’ convenience. We name three algorithms for effort-subresponsive,
effort-unresponsive, and effort-responsive regimes as CP-SUBRES, CP-UNRES, and CP-RES.
Effort-subresponsive regimes. As stated in Theorem 4.3, this regime requires the optimal pricing that
is [ℓ, u]-picking. Using this structural property, CP-SUBRES operated with the following skeleton:
Skeleton of CP-SUBRES
(i) Sort the entire workers in decreasing order of their qualities, and reassign the index. Then, initialize
the upper worker index u = n.
(ii) For the index u, over ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , u}, search the index ℓ⋆(u) that provides the maximum utility over
the pricing schemes π(ℓ, u) that induces [ℓ, u]-picking and is budget-feasible.
(iii) If u > 1, then set u = u− 1 and go to Step (ii), otherwise go to Step (iv).
(iv) Compute the maximum pricing π⋆ as follows:
π⋆ = arg max
{π(ℓ⋆(u),u):u=1,...,n}
U (π(ℓ⋆(u), u)) .
The algorithm operates in such a way that we iterate the upper worker index u = 1, . . . , n, and for each
upper index u, we find that the lower worker index ℓ⋆(u) such that the pricing inducing [ℓ⋆(u), u]-picking
with satisfying the budget constraint (Steps (i)-(iii)). Then, we produce the output pricing as the optimal
one that maximizes the utility over all per-u best pricing schemes with budget feasibility in (iv).
All steps seem straightforward except for (ii). Note that for a fixed upper worker index u, the utility is
monotone-increasing with respect to the lower worker index l = u, u − 1, . . . , 1, i.e. as l decreases. Thus,
assuming that we can easily find the pricing π(ℓ, u) that induces [ℓ, u]-picking and check whether π(ℓ, u)
satisfies the budget constraint or not, it is possible for us to utilize an efficient search method, e.g., the
binary search algorithm for fast searching. We now discuss how to compute π(ℓ, u) and check whether it
is budget-feasible or not. A natural way of handling this is that we aim at finding (p, q), such that for the
worker index i ∈ [ℓ, u], q× ri+p ≥ ci, and for other index i /∈ [ℓ, u], q× ri+p < ci, and the budget constraint∑u
i=ℓ(q × ri + p) ≤ B. Since many well-known algorithms to solve an LP basically assumed that there is no
strict inequality constraint, we firstly need to deal with the strict inequality constraints. In here, we propose
a method to handle such difficulties using a special structural property coming from our assumed regime i.e.
the function f in ri = f(ci) is concave, and the fact that our problem is only to find a feasible point. This
will be elaborated in the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Effort-unresponsive regime. As stated in Theorem 4.3, the optimal pricing in effort-unresponsive regime
is [ℓ, n]-picking, which is a special case of [ℓ, u]-picking, where u = n. Thus, CP-SUBRES can be applied to
this regime without any modification. However, the fact that u = n gives rise to an additional property
that no base payment is necessary, and only bonus payment is enough for the optimal pricing (see the proof
of Theorem 4.4). This additional property significantly simplifies the search process of CP-SUBRES so that
it suffices to find ℓ in [ℓ, n]-picking. Technically, the linear programming step in (ii) of CP-SUBRES is not
required. We describe CP-UNRES in Appendix, and Theorem 4.4 presents the running time complexity of
CP-UNRES.
Effort-responsive regime. This regime requires the optimal pricing to be [ℓ, u]-blocking, which can be
interpreted as a “dual” of effort-subresponsive regime. However, the search of ℓ and u in this regime is highly
similar to that of CP-SUBRES, as explained in what follows. While fixing upper index u, we search the index
ℓ⋆(u) over ℓ ∈ {1, 2, ..., u} that provides the maximum utility over the pricing schemes π(ℓ, u) that induces
[ℓ, u]-blocking and is budget-feasible. Then, we linearly probe the index u ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and find the optimal
scheme among the upper index u. The full algorithm CP-RES in this regime is described in Appendix.
Theorem 4.4 states the correctness of three algorithms and their running time complexity. Note that the
given budget B = B(n) may scale with the number of workers n, for which we include it in the running time
analysis in the theorem.
Theorem 4.4 With given budget B = B(n), CP-SUBRES and CP-RES output their optimal CP pricing
schemes in O
(
B(n)n logn
)
times, respectively, and CP-UNRES outputs the optimal CP scheme in O(n) time.
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5 Power of Bonus and Price of Agnosticity
In this section, we provide theoretical comparison between personalized and common pricing policies in terms
of power of bonus (Q2) and price of agnosticity (Q3).
5.1 Power of Bonus
The impact of bonus payment may differ for both personalized and common pricing policies. A natural
intuition is that such a power of bonus is weaker in personalized pricing than in common one. This is
because in common pricing, the bonus payment may be the only device to filter out and compensate for
high-quality workers’ effort, whereas personalized pricing has full capability to manipulate individual user’s
behavior by matching individual payment to targeted user’s cost. Indeed, recalling (6) in Theorem 3.1, we
can always find an optimal PP policy without bonus, where each worker i is offered only ci as base payment
if she is targeted, i.e., x⋆i = 1, and is offered nothing if she is not targeted, i.e., x
⋆
i = 0. This implies that the
bonus payment does not help in increasing the optimal utility of personalized pricing.
We now study impact of bonus in common pricing policies. Our intuition is that there exists a certain
amount of gain from the bonus payment, since without it, there is almost no way to incentivize high-quality
workers, and to prevent inefficient payment to low-quality workers or cherry pickers. We quantify this
intuition by providing an example, where the ratio of optimal utility of common pricing policy without
bonus to that without bonus can be arbitrarily small.
Theorem 5.1 For any given c > 0 and ε ∈ [0, 1), consider an additive utility function U such that U(r◦x) =∑n
i=1 rixi, and worker profile (r, c) given by:
(ri, ci) =


(ε, c) if 0 < i ≤ 12n (8a)
(1, 2c) if 12n < i ≤
3
4n (8b)
(2, 2c) if 34n < i ≤ n. (8c)
Then, for budget B = (n+4)2 c, the following holds for n ≥ 2:
U⋆
CP,o
U⋆
CP
≤ ε , (9)
where U⋆
CP
and U⋆
CP,o are the optimal utilities in OCP and OCP with additional constraint q = 0, respectively.
In this example, the worker profile in (8) has three groups: cherry pickers in the first half (8a), mid-quality
workers in the third quarter (8b), and high-quality workers in the last quarter (8c), An optimal CP policy
without bonus, obtained as (p, q) = (c, 0), fails to attract qualified workers, and wastes budget for only cherry
workers. However, an optimal PP policy, obtained as (p, q) = (0, 2c), fully exploits the bonus payment so
that it is attractive to only high-quality workers. Such difference between two policies with and without
bonus causes huge difference shown in (9). A formal proof of Theorem 5.1 is provided in Section 6.5.
5.2 Price of Agnosticity
We now address the question (Q3) by quantitatively comparing personalized and common pricing policies
with bonus, which reveals how close a simple common pricing with bonus payment is to the personalized
pricing. To do so, we first define the following notion of Price of Agnosticity (PoA).
Definition 5.2 For given B, let U⋆
PP
(B) and U⋆
CP
(B) denote the optimal utilities in OPP (3) and OCP
(4). Then, we say that PoA is (γ, δ) for budget B ≥ 0, if
U⋆CP(δB) ≥ γ · U
⋆
PP(B) .
where 0 < γ ≤ 1, and 1 ≤ δ.
x
The constants γ and δ capture the inefficiency of using common pricing instead of personalized pricing in
terms of utility and budget, respectively. We note that PoA is (1, 1) when there exists a common pricing
that achieves the utility of the optimal personalized pricing with the same budget. Hence, PoA (γ, δ) close
to (1, 1) implies that it is enough to use a common pricing policy, which is much simpler than a personalized
one, if it is properly designed. In the following theorem, we quantify PoA under canonical assumptions.
Theorem 5.3 Consider a worker profile (r, c), where worker index is sorted in descending order of bang-
per-buck ηi =
ri
ci
, i.e., η1 ≥ ... ≥ ηn, and budget B ≥ 0. Assume utility function u satisfying that for all
i ∈ N such that ci ≤ B,
U⋆PP(B) ≥ 2 · U(r ◦ e(i)), (10)
where e(i) is the sequence such that e(i),i = 1 and e(i),j = 0 for all j 6= i. Then, the followings hold:
(a) Under C1, PoA is (12 , δkB ),
(b) Under C2, PoA is (γkB , δkB ),
where we define kB := max{k :
∑k
i=1 ci ≤ B},
γk := 1−
rk+1
r1 + ...+ rk
, and δk :=
ck
rk
·
r1 + ...+ rk
c1 + ...+ ck
.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is provided in Section 6.6. We now briefly provide the interpretation of Theorem 5.3,
followed by more in-depth description in the subsequent paragraphs. This theorem basically implies that
under a mild condition as in (10), the optimal common policy (which can be computed in polynomial time)
provides at least a half of the optimal utility of personalized policy as in (a), or more as in (b) with a small
increase of allocated budget. Noting that the optimal personalized pricing is computationally intractable for
a large number of workers n, the actual utility due to common pricing would be closer to what a practical
personalized pricing is able to provide. This shows that a simple bonus payment that are uniformly applied,
not personalized, to all workers turns out to have a large power in recruiting high-quality workers and
discourage low-quality ones. We also highlight that utility of common pricing without this bonus payment
can be arbitrarily worse than that with bonus (see Theorem 5.1), which manifests that the role of bonus
payment in common pricing is crucial.
Note that the condition in (10) means that the optimal utility of personalized pricing is simply twice
larger than the utility from a pricing which recruits only a single user, which is readily satisfied when the
number of workers in the system is reasonably large. In other words, we can find a sufficiently large n, such
that (10) is met. We now investigate how δkB behaves with worker profiles {(ri, ci)}i∈N . First, from the
hypothesis that workers are sorted by bang-per-buck ηi = ri/ci and the construction of the worker index kB,
we can easily check that that (i) δkB ≥ 1 and (ii) γkB ≤ 1/2. The value of δkB depends on how ri depends
on ci, i.e, the form of f(·) in ri = f(ci). To exemplify, we consider two types of f(·), one is concave (thus,
effort-unresponsive) and one is convex (thus, effort-responsive) as in Figure 1a. We uniformly generate 100
workers respectively. Figure 1b shows how δkB changes for different values of k for those two types of f(·)
functions. We observe that when f(·) is concave, δkBk is maintained to be small.
6 Proofs of Main Results
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We start with the proof of the first part by contradiction. Let x⋆ = {φi(p⋆i , q
⋆
i )}i∈N , where π
⋆ = {(p⋆i , q
⋆
i )}i∈N
is the solution of OPP, i.e., utility of π⋆ is U(r ◦ x⋆). Then it is straightforward to check that x⋆ satisfies
the constraint in (5b). Suppose x⋆ is not a solution of GKP so that there exists a solution x′ such that
U(r ◦ x′) > U(r ◦ x⋆). We now construct a PP policy π′ = {(cix′i, 0)}i∈N from x
′. Since x′ is a solution of
GKP, policy π′ satisfies the constraints in (3b) and (3c). The construction of π′ contradicts to the optimality
of π⋆, since the utility of π′ is strictly larger than that of π⋆ This completes the proof of the first part.
Similarly to the proof of the first part, we also prove the second part by contradiction. Let π⋆ be the
pricing in (6) for a solution x⋆ of GKP and some {pi}i∈N such that pi ∈ [0, ci] for all i ∈ N . It is not hard
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Figure 1: Behavior of budget approximation ratio δkB for two cost-quality functions.
to check that π⋆ satisfies the constraints in (3b) and (3c). Suppose the policy π⋆ is not a solution of OPP.
Then there exists a solution π′ = {(p′i, q
′
i)}i∈N such that U(r ◦ x
′) > U(r ◦ x⋆), where x′ = {φi(p′i, q
′
i)}i∈N .
This contradicts to the optimality of x⋆, and completes the proof of the second part, and thus Theorem 3.1.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Without loss of generality, suppose that the workers are aligned in the descending order of bang-per-buck
ηi =
ri
ci
, i.e., η1 ≥ ... ≥ ηn. Let x⋆ be the output of ModifiedGreedy. Then, we will obtain a lower bound
of U(r ◦ x⋆), for which consider the linear relaxation of GKP (GKP-relax) in the following:
GKP-relax: maximize
z∈[0,1]n
U(r ◦ z) (11a)
subject to
n∑
i=1
cizi ≤ B . (11b)
We obtain a solution of GKP-relax in the following lemma, whose proof will be presented at the end of this
subsection:
Lemma 6.1 Let z⋆ denote a n-dimensional real-valued sequence such that z⋆i = 1 if i < k
′, z⋆i = α if i = k
′,
and z⋆i = 0 otherwise, where k
′ = inf{k :
∑k
i=1 ci > B}, and α =
B−(c1+...+ck′−1)
ck′
. Then, z⋆ is a solution of
GKP-relax in (11).
With z⋆ in Lemma 6.1, the following holds, because the optimal value of GKP is smaller than or equal to
that of its relaxed problem GKP-relax:
U(r ◦ z⋆) ≥ U⋆PP. (12)
Let x′ be the sequence such that x′i = 1 if i < k
′ and x′i = 0 otherwise, where we have x
′ = z⋆ − αe(k′). Let
m = argmaxi U(r ◦ e(i)). Then, from the construction of x
′ and m, it follows that
U(r ◦ z⋆) ≤ U
(
r ◦
(
z⋆ − αe(k′)
))
+ U
(
r ◦
(
αe(k′)
))
≤ U (r ◦ x′) + U
(
r ◦ e(m)
)
≤ 2U (r ◦ x⋆) , (13)
where for the first, second and last inequalities, we use the subadditivity of U(·) in C1, 0 ≤ α < 1, and x⋆ is
output of ModifiedGreedy, respectively. Combining (12) and (13), we complete the proof of Theorem 3.3.
We remark that the subadditivity assumed in C2 can be loosen. To be precise, the condition for any two
vectors a and b in Rn can be loosen to, two vectors a and b with no index that ai > 0 and bi > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. We use the proof by contradiction. Suppose that z⋆ is not the solution of GKP-
relax, and consider z with U(r ◦ z) > U(r ◦ z⋆). Note that
∑
i∈N ciz
⋆
i = B and
∑
i∈N cizi = B due to the
definition of z⋆ and the non-decreasing property of U(·). To complete the proof, we will construct a sequence
of feasible instances of GKP-relax using a greedy iteration σ(·), where from given a ∈ Rn, σ(a) = a′ is
obtained as follows:
xii
(i) Find j, k ∈ N and ε > 0 such that j < k, 0 ≤ aj < 1, 0 < ak ≤ 1, and ε = min
{
1− aj ,
ck
cj
ak
}
.
(ii) a′j = aj + ε, a
′
k = ak −
cj
ck
ε, and a′i = ai for i 6= j, k.
Let z′ = σ(z), and let j, k, ε be those in the greedy iteration for z. In the greedy iteration, we have
cjzj + ckzk = cj(zj + ε) + ck
(
zk −
cj
ck
ε
)
= cjz
′
j + ckz
′
k ,
which implies
∑
i∈N cizi =
∑
i∈N ciz
′
i. It is straightforward to check that the sequence of feasible instances
z, z′ = σ(z), σ(σ(z)), ... from iteration of σ(·) converges to z⋆ after n-th iteration. Thus, it suffices to show
the following:
U(r ◦ z) ≤ U(r ◦ z′) , (14)
since the above implies U(r ◦ z) ≤ U(r ◦ z′) ≤ ... ≤ U(r ◦ z⋆), which contradicts to the hypothesis on the
optimality of z, and thus completes the proof of Lemma 6.1. To show (14), we compare r ◦ z and r ◦ z′.
Noting that ηj =
rj
cj
≥ ηk =
rk
ck
, it follows that
0 ≤ rkzk − rkz
′
k = rk
cj
ck
≤ rjε = rjz
′
j − rjzj ,
which implies that comparing r ◦ z to r ◦ z′, the amount of increment in j-th element is larger than that
of decrement in k-th element. Hence, r ◦ z′ weakly majorizes r ◦ z, i.e., r ◦ z ≺w r ◦ z′. Using this, the
assumptions on U(·), i.e., non-decreasing and Schur-convex, directly implies (14) This completes the proof
of Lemma 6.1.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
For ease of presentation, we first define some notations. Let Ri = Ri(ci) be the expected payment of worker
i if she accepts the task, i.e. Ri(ci) = qri+p = qf(ci)+p, and let h(ci) :=
Ri(ci)
ci
. Then, a worker i’s strategic
decision xi can be expressed as xi = 1[h(ci) ≥ 1]. Hence, we are able to analyze the worker’s behavior by
observing h(ci) for i ∈ N . In order to see the dynamic of the function h, we differentiate h(ci) by ci as
follows:
∂h(ci)
∂ci
=
1
c2i
(
∂f(ci)
∂ci
qci − (qf(ci) + p)
)
. (15)
Since f ′(c) < f(c)
c
for c ∈ R in effort-unresponsive regime, (15) always negative. This means that h(ci) is
monotone decreasing in ci, implying that xi = 1[h(ci) ≥ 1] is also monotone decreasing in ci. This verifies
that the resulting policy is always [ℓ, n]-picking for effort-unresponsive regime.
We now consider the case when f ′(c) ≥ f(c)
c
for c ∈ R. We compute the sign of the second order derivative
of (15) as follows:
sgn
(
∂2h(ci)
∂c2i
)
= sgn
(
∂(∂cif(ci)
ci
− f(ci))
∂c2i
)
(16)
= sgn
(
∂2f(ci)
∂ci
+ ci
∂2f(ci)
∂c2i
−
∂f(ci)
∂ci
)
= sgn
(
∂2f(ci)
∂c2i
)
. (17)
Hence, h(ci) is convex in effort-responsive regime, and concave in effort-subresponsive regime.
Note the basic property that any level set of a convex function is a convex set. Hence, in effort-responsive
regime, the level set {ci | h(ci) ≤ 1} is a convex set. Recall that that xi = 1[h(ci) ≥ 1], which means
that for each worker i with h(ci) ≤ 1 does not take the task. This implies that any pricing policy (p, q) in
effort-responsive regime is [ℓ, u]-blocking. In effort-subresponsive regime, where h(ci) is concave, we take the
similar argument to that in effort-responsive regime, it follows that any pricing policy (p, q) is [ℓ, u]-picking.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
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6.4 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Effort-unresponsive regime. We first prove that CP-UNRES finds an optimal CP policy for effort-
unresponsive regime in O(n) time. Note that CP-UNRES outputs a CP policy which is optimal among the
one whose base payment equals to 0. For notational simplicity, without loss of generality, the workers are
aligned in the descending order of cost. Consider a CP policy (p′, q′) where p′ 6= 0, and suppose that it is
[ℓ, n]-picking. Then, we have qri + p ≥ ci for i = ℓ, ℓ+ 1, . . . , n, and the total expected payment to workers
given by:
n∑
ℓ
(riq + p) ≥
n∑
ℓ
(
ri(
cℓ − p
rℓ
) + p
)
=
n∑
i=ℓ
cℓri
rℓ
+ (n− ℓ′ + 1)p′ −
∑n
i=k+1 ri
rk+1
p′
≥
cℓ
rℓ
(
n∑
i=ℓ
ri
)
, (18)
where (18) denotes the total payment to workers from ℓ to n of policy (0, cℓ
rℓ
). Hence, for any [ℓ, n]-picking
pricing policy (p′, q′) in effort-unresponsive regime, a pricing policy (0, cℓ
rℓ
) achieves the same amount of
utility, while spends less budget. Using this fact, CP-UNRES (presented in Appendix) is designed to compute
just the bonus payment which produces the largest utility, where it is easy to check the complexity of
CP-UNRES needs O(n) time. This completes the proof.
Effort-subresponsive regime. We next prove that CP-SUBRES find an optimal CP policy for effort-
subresponsive regime in O(B(n)n log n) time, where CP-SUBRES is presented in Appendix. We observe that
CP-SUBRES solves a linear programming Aℓ,ux ≤ bℓ,u over (ℓ, u) where u iterates from n to 1 while we perform
the binary search for optimal ℓ⋆(u). Hence, let the running time of linear programming be LP (n), and the
entire running time can be expressed as O(LP (n) · n logn).
We now prove that for given ℓ and u, finding π(ℓ, u) that induces [ℓ, u]-picking and is budget-feasible or
deciding its non-existence takes O(B(n)) time. Recall that any pricing policy in effort-subresponsive regime
is [ℓ, u]-picking. Thus, the following inequalities are sufficient for a CP policy (p, q) to be [ℓ, u]-picking:
qrℓ−1 + p < cℓ−1 (19)
qrℓ + p ≥ cℓ (20)
qru + p ≥ cu (21)
qru+1 + p < cu+1 (22)
u∑
i=ℓ
(qri + p) ≤ B, (23)
which can be simply expressed as Aℓ,ux ≤ bℓ,u by loosening the strict inequality, where the matrices Aℓ,u
and bℓ,u is defined in Appendix. Then, we can check if there exists a budget-feasible policy in O(B = B(n))
time [47]. Now suppose that the output of Aℓ,ux ≤ bℓ,u satisfies the equality on either of the (19) or (22).
Assume that the equality holds for (19) on output (p, q) of CP-SUBRES. We show that there exists a positive
real value ǫ in which (p− ǫ, q) is also feasible to Aℓ,ux ≤ bℓ,u, and does not satisfy the equality on (19). Since
decrementing (p, q) to (p− ǫ, q) can possibly harm (20) or (21), it is sufficient to show that there exists such
ǫ such that (20) and (21) are met. Suppose that the following holds for CP policy (p, q):
qrℓ−1 + p = cℓ−1, qrℓ + p = cℓ. (24)
This means that cℓ−1 − qrℓ−1 = cℓ − qrℓ, which can be expressed as the following:
cℓ−1
(
1− q
rℓ−1
cℓ−1
)
= cℓ
(
1− q
rℓ
cℓ
)
. (25)
In effort-subresponsive regime, ri
ci
is monotone increasing in ci. Thus, in order for the equality to hold in (25),
we must have that cℓ−1 = cℓ. Then, however, rℓ−1 = rℓ also holds, where it becomes impossible for any CP
xiv
pricing (p, q) to be [ℓ, u]-picking. Similarly, it can be shown that (19) and (21) cannot simultaneously satisfy
the equality. Note that the equality in (22) cannot be satisfied. Elaborating these facts together, there exists
a positive real value ǫ > 0 which makes CP policy (p − ǫ, q) to be [ℓ, u]-picking and budget-feasible. Recall
that the LP Aℓ,ux ≤ bℓ,u can be solved in O(B(n)) [47], which completes the proof for effort-subresponsive
regime.
Effort-responsive regime. Due to high similar to effort-subresponsive regime, we omit this proof for
brevity.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let n(p, q) = |{i ∈ N : φi(p, q) = 1}| be the number of workers who accept the task given a CP policy (p, q).
Let nℓ, nm, and nh be the numbers of workers with the profiles (ε, c), (1, 2c), and (2, 2c), respectively. Using
these notations, we first obtain an upper bound of U⋆CP,o. Using the fact that nℓ workers have cost c and the
rest of workers have cost 2c, it is straightforward to check
n(p, 0) =
{
nℓ if c ≤ p < 2c
n if 2c ≤ p ,
which implies p ≥ 2c is infeasible for budget B = (n+4)2 c < 2c · n. Therefore, (c, 0) is a feasible and an
optimal CP policy when bonus must be zero. Furthermore, we obtain:
U⋆CP,o = εnℓ ≤
n
2
ε , (26)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that nℓ ≤
n
2 and the choice of utility function U(r ◦ x) =∑n
i=1 rixi.
We now obtain a lower bound of U⋆CP. To this end, consider a CP policy (0, c) without base payment.
Since there is only bonus payment, workers only with profile (2, 2c) accept the task, i.e., n(0, c) = nh.
A simple number theory implies n4 ≤ nh ≤
n
4 + 1, and thus the CP policy (0, c) is feasible for budget
B = n+42 c ≥ 2c · nh. Therefore, it follows that:
U⋆CP ≥ 2nh ≥
n
2
. (27)
Combining (26) and (27), the result holds.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Since the optimal pricing in PP always dominates the pricing produced by CP-UNRES, the following holds for
any worker profile r:
U⋆PP(B) ≥ U(r ◦ x
g), (28)
where xg = [xgi ]i∈N is the vector of x
g
i = 1[p
g + riq
g ≥ ci] for the CP policy π
g = (pg, qg) by CP-UNRES.
We now prove that, given an additional budget δkBB, πg exactly achieves the utility of ModifiedGreedy.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, recall that ModifiedGreedy recruits either the workers 1, 2, . . . , kB or the
highest-quality worker. Using the hypothesis of U⋆PP(B) ≥ 2 ·U(r ◦e(i)), it is straightforward to see that the
highest-quality worker is not selected, thus the workers 1, 2, . . . , kB are chosen by ModifiedGreedy.
We now compute the budget required for CP-UNRES to recruit the workers 1, 2, . . . , kB . Since the output
of CP-UNRES has the form of (0, qg), where qg must satisfy qg ≥
ckB
rkB
, since it recruits the worker kB . Thus,
the total expected payment of CP-UNRES is larger than or equal to
ckB
rkB
(∑kB
i=1 ri
)
. Using the fact that the
workers are aligned in descending order of bang-per-buck, the following holds:
kB∑
i=1
ckB
rkB
ri =
ckB
rkB
(r1 + . . .+ rkB ) (29)
xv
=
ckB
rkB
r1 + . . .+ rkB
c1 + . . .+ ckB
(c1 + . . .+ ckB ) (30)
= δkB (c1 + . . .+ ckB ) ≤ δkBB. (31)
Then, the total payment to workers turns out to be at most δkBB in CP-UNRES when it recruits the same set
of workers as ModifiedGreedy does with budget B. Hence, CP-UNRES with additional budget δkBB achieves
the approximation ratio of 12 , compared to the optimal PP policy with budget B, since ModifiedGreedy has
the approximation ratio 12 . Thus, we get CP-UNRES has PoA of (
1
2 , δkB ).
In an additive utility function, the following holds for kB:
U⋆CP(δkBB)
U⋆PP(B)
≥
U(r ◦ xg)
U⋆PP(B)
(32)
≥ 1−
rkB+1
U⋆PP(B)
, (33)
where (32) holds since optimal CP policy with budget δkB leads to a larger utility than optimal PP policy
with budget B, and (33) holds due to the fact that U(r◦(xg+e(kB+1))) ≥ U
⋆
PP(B), as proved in Section 6.2.
Thus, as in (32), we have:
(33) ≥ 1−
rkB+1
U⋆CP(δkBB)
(34)
≥
r1 + r2 + . . . rkB − rkB+1
r1 + r2 + . . . rkB
. (35)
Thus, CP-UNRES with budget δkBB achieves the approximation ratio of 1 −
rkB+1
r1+r2+...+rkB
to optimal PP
policy with budget B. This completes the proof.
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Figure 2: For the typo correction task with M = 25, for various bonus policies: m-threshold policies with
different m and linear policy, we first plot (a) cost-quality profiles; (b) workers’ decisions given optimal CP
policies; (c) base and bonus payments of optimal CP policies; (d) utilities of optimal PP and CP policies
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7 Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we present simulation and real experimental results, which support our analytical findings
and further provide some useful implications, in particular, on the qualification of workers.
7.1 Simulation
Setup. We consider the typo correction task mentioned in Section 2. The total number of typos is M = 25,
and the number of workers is n = 15. We assume workers strategically decide whether or not to take the
task as described in (2). Each worker i is associated with cost ci and ability si, where once she accepts the
task, she corrects random number Yi of typos at constant cost ci, and each typo is detected and corrected
independently with probability si. Recalling each worker’ quality is her normalized expectation of bonus, the
ability si can be translated into various qualities qi, depending on the employed bonus policy that estimates
worker i’s quality from Yi and decides the amount of bonus, while Yi depends on only ability si (i.e., Yi is a
binomial distribution with parameter si). We consider the following bonus policies, which provide a variety
of different translation of ability to quality:
◦ m-threshold. This grants the bonus only if Yi ≥ m to each worker i. Hence the instant bonus is given
as qi · 1[Yi ≥ m], and thus the ability si is translated into quality qi as
qi = bm(si) :=
M∑
k=m
(
M
k
)
ski (1− si)
M−k .
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◦ Linear. This grants the bonus proportional to Yi/M to each worker i. Thus, the instant bonus is given
as qi · Yi/M , and thus the ability si is translated into quality qi as qi = si.
As observed in our earlier analysis, e.g., Theorem 4.3, the optimal pricing depends on the worker profile,
where a bonus policy defines the translation of ability to quality, and thus controls the worker profile. In
this section, we numerically study the optimal pricing with a different choice of bonus policy, where we use
an exhaustive search to obtain an optimal pricing for each setting. In our simulations, we generate cost ci
and correction probability si from some distribution
6, and consider budget B = 4 and the utility function
in (1), i.e., the expected number of typos, each of which is corrected by at least one worker.
Qualities under different bonus policies. We first investigate how the worker qualities change for
different bonus polices, shown in Figure 2a, where for m-threshold bonus, we vary the value of m. First, we
observe that the cost-quality curve of the linear bonus policy shows the distribution of cost ci and ability si
since ability si is directly translated into quality ri. Here the quality almost linearly varies in a small range
[0.7, 0.9] even if the cost varies in a wide range [0.25, 0.8]. This can be interpreted as the fact that the worker
profile generated by the linear policy is in effort-unresponsive regime, where worker qualities with different
cost are not very differentiated. Similarly, m-threshold policy with small m = 15 has the effort-unresponsive
worker profile. However, m-threshold with large m translates the small gap between worker abilities into
a large gap between worker qualities. Hence, we numerically confirm that as m increases, quality becomes
more sensitive to cost, and thus the worker profile with m = 19 and m = 23 changes to effort-subresponsive
and effort-responsive, respectively. Such changes of the worker profiles imply the possibility of controlling
worker quality by controlling the bonus policy.
Optimal CP in different regimes. We now study how optimal CP can be controlled manipulating the
worker profile through bonus policy. First, in Figure 2b, we present workers who accept the task under the
optimal CP with different bonus policies. With the linear policy and the m-threshold with small m ≤ 17,
resulting in effort-unresponstive regime, the optimal CP targets only low-quality workers, which coincide
with [ℓ, n]-picking in Theorem 4.3. Further, as m increases, the system becomes more of effort-responsive
regime passing through effort-subresponsive regime, and thus the target of optimal CP move to mid-quality
workers, i.e., [ℓ, u]-picking when 18 ≤ m ≤ 19, and then to high- and low- quality workers, i.e., [ℓ, u]-blocking
when 22 ≤ m, while there are unclassified regimes in the transition from [ℓ, u]-picking to [ℓ, u]-blocking when
m = 20, 21. Next, in Figure 2c, for different values ofm in m-threshold bonus policy, we compute the optimal
CP, showing that how the optimal base and bonus payments change for different cost-quality regimes. When
m ≤ 17, i.e., effort-unresponsive regime, we observe that giving only the bonus payment is optimal. When
m ≥ 17, the base payment becomes positive, where, in particular, for m ∈ [19, 22], the ratio of base to bonus
payments becomes non-negligible. However, for m = 25, which is back to effort-unresponsive regime, the
base payment becomes again very low.
Power of bonus and price of agnosticity. In Figure 2d, we compare the utilities of optimal PP and
CP with different bonus polices, and also optimal PP and CP without bonus, where the optimal PP and CP
without bonus are obtained assuming worker abilities {si} is given directly, since for any m, quality with
m-threshold policy can be reversely translated into ability, i.e., the translation is invertible. We observe
that, regardless of the choice of bonus policy, the optimal utility of PP achieves the same value, while the
worker quality changes dramatically with respect to m as shown in Figure 1a. As studied in Theorem 3.1,
this is because the bonus payment is not mandatory for PP, having the mighty controllability with only base
payment. Indeed, the computed optimal PP with m-threshold bonus has zero bonus for all m. As stated in
Theorem 5.3, the utility gap between PP and CP’s is marginal. In fact, it is not hard to see that PoA (γ, 1)
is very close to (1, 1). However, comparing CP without bonus to PP or CP with bonus, the utility decrease
due to absence of bonus is significant. This implies that despite loss of controllability, only well-designed
CP can fully exploit the benefit from using bonus payment. On the choice of bonus policy, we see that the
utility of optimal CP with m-threshold is increasing before m = 20, decreasing after m = 21, and maximized
at m = 20, although the variation is not large. When m is too small, even low-quality workers can get
bonus easily, and thus the utility degenerates due to the waste of budget to low-quality workers. When m is
too large, even high-quality workers think the qualification for bonus is too strict, which limits the number
of recruited workers. Hence, this results suggests to define challenging but doable qualification for bonus
6 We sample {ci}i∈N from the beta distribution with α = β = 5, and map ci to si using some reasonable logistic function
of ci, where we use si = 1/(1 + e−3ci).
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Figure 3: Experiment results of typo correction task in Amazon Mechanical Turk.
payment.
7.2 Real-world Experiment
We conduct real experiments on a popular crowdsourcing platform, Amazon Mechnical Turk (Mturk). In
Mturk, PP policy is infeasible, since the platform does not only provide incoming workers’ profile in advance,
but also it is discouraged to discriminate users via individual pricing. Hence, we focus on the real-world per-
formance of only CP policy, which justifies our theoretical findings, and provides useful insight on designing
a simple pricing in practice.
Experiment setup. In our experiments, we asked workers to proofread an article consisting of 318 words
with 15 typos, which we randomly inserted from a list of common spelling errors. Workers were asked to
provide the line number of each typo, the incorrect word, and the corrected word. We consider 8 CP policies,
each of which differs in terms of bonus policy, and the amount of base/bonus payments (p, q). First, as bonus
policies, we use m-threshold, and linear policies with m = 8 or 14 and (p, q) = ($0.1, $0.4) or ($0.1, $1.4),
where with the goal of preventing workers from knowing threshold value m, which results in bias, we convert
each m into its corresponding percentage, when posted, i.e., 50%- and 90%- thresholds instead of 8- and
14-thresholds. To study the impact of bonus, we use CP policies without bonus such that (p, q) = ($1, 0)
or ($1.6, 0). To avoid bias in the experiment, we distribute the same task over 480 workers, where each of
8 CP policies is a subset of 60 workers, which are selected uniformly at random without overlapping. As
a result, up to 32 hours after posting the task, 172 workers out of 480 took the task and reported 1, 616
typos. For each pricing policy, we present utility, total payment, and the number of participants over time
xix
in Figure 3, where we extend the typo correction utility in (1), and define a redundant utility as the number
of typos, each of which is corrected by at least 10 workers. We believe that compared to the typo correction
utility without redundant counting, the redundant utility is more suitable and useful, since this redundancy
eliminates the impact of outliers (i.e., the workers who correct every typo at low price) whose number is
extremely small in our experiment.
Power of bonus. In Figures 3b and 3c, comparing to pricing ($0.1, $1.4) with 90%-threshold bonus,
pricing ($1.6, 0) without bonus has poorer utility, while it spent 6.35 times more budget: $43.2. vs. $6.8.
This clearly supports the power of bonus in Theorem 5.1. In Figure 3d, the number of participants under
the pricing ($0.1, $1.4) with 90%-threshold bonus and the pricing ($1.6, 0) are simiarly many: 26 and 27,
respectively. Hence, this implies that the utility loss of the pricing ($1.6, 0) can be interpreted as workers’
sloppy participation, which might be caused by the fact that their performance would not be affected by
what they earn from the task.
Choice of bonus policy. We now compare bonus policies. In overall, it can be seen that linear bonus does
not work well, compared to 50%-threshold or 90%-threshold bonus. For example, compared to 90%-threshold
with bonus $0.4, the linear policy with generous bonus $1.4 has a similar utility, even though it spends 5.7
times more budget. This can be explained as different minds of workers, given the linear and threshold
policies. Under the linear policy, even if a worker walks away in the middle of the task, she would get some
bonus for the effort made by that time. However, under the threshold-based policy, once she starts the task,
she might try to finish it rather than to give up in the middle due to risk of getting no bonus. Further, it
is interesting to compare the time to reach a certain level of utility. Comparing 50%- and 90%-threshold
policies with the same bonus value $1.4, in Figure 3b, 50%-threshold reaches maximum utility 15 in much
shorter time than 90%-threshold:4 and 14 hours after release. This suggests us a trade-off between relaxed
(50%) and tight (90%) bonus policies which provide quicker response with more budget, and slower response
with less budget, respectively.
8 Conclusion
Posted pricing is popular in practical crowdsourcing systems. In this paper, we analytically studied the
impact of personalization and bonus payment in posted pricing. We first derived the optimal personalized and
common pricing schemes and analyze their computational tractability, where optimal personalized posted
pricing is proved to be NP-hard, but optimal common pricing is polynomial-time solvable under various
regimes of cost-quality relations. We also studied how powerful bonus payment is in common pricing,
where it was established that a simple idea of bonus in common pricing is able to control the behaviors of
workers well, so as to properly recruit and discourage high-quality and low-quality workers, respectively. Our
analytical findings, verified through simulations and real experiments, support many current crowdsourcing
systems running with simple pricing policies and provide useful implications on how to intelligently employ
workers via well-designed pricing policies.
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9 Appendix
Typo correction task. We prove that
U(r ◦ x) = M ·
(
1−
∏
i∈N
(
1− b−1m (rixi)
))
, (36)
is Schur-convex and subadditive with respect to y = r ◦ x. Since subadditivity is straightforward, we focus
only on Schur-convexity. Note that U(·) is symmetric and continuously differentiable thanks to continuously
differentiability of bm(si). Then, it suffices to show the following: for any i 6= j ∈ N :
(yi − yj)
(
∂U
∂yi
−
∂U
∂yj
)
≥ 0, (37)
by Schur-Ostrowski criterion. We will apply the chain rule at ∂U
∂yi
, i.e., ∂U
∂yi
= ∂U
∂si
· ∂si
∂yi
. We now prove that if
si ≥ sj , (i)
∂U
∂si
≥ ∂U
∂sj
, and (ii) ∂si
∂yi
≥ ∂sj
∂yj
. For (i), note that
∂U
∂si
=
∏
k 6=i,k∈N (1− sk),
which proves (i) since 1− si ≤ 1− sj . For (ii), we use the inverse function theorem, i.e.,
∂si
∂yi
= 1/
(
∂yi
∂si
)
.
Thus, it suffices to show that ∂yi
∂si
≤ ∂yj
∂si
. Expanding and merging the binomial coefficients in ∂yi
∂si
, we get
sm−1(1− s)M−m, whose derivative leads us to obtain that ∂yi
∂si
increases when si ≤
m−1
M−2m+1 , and decreases
when si >
m−1
M−2m+1 . Thus, if m = 1, this value always decreases with respect to si. Put all these together,
we get U is Schur-convex with respect to r.
Binary labeling task. Consider a labeling task to recover the true label ytrue ∈ {−1, 1} and choose the
highest possible accuracy7 as the task utility function, where the probability of worker i to label correctly
is r′i ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the quality of worker i can be the information gain of her label, compared to random
guess, i.e., ri = 2 ·
∣∣1
2 − r
′
i
∣∣ ∈ [0, 1], and the task utility function is obtained as
U(r ◦ x) ∝
∑
y∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∏
i=1
(
1+rixi
2
)yi ( 1−rixi
2
)1−yi
−
n∏
i=1
(
1−rixi
2
)yi ( 1+rixi
2
)1−yi ∣∣∣∣∣ , (38)
We can prove that the above utility function is Schur-convex, and subadditive with respect to r.
9.1 Algorithms: CP-SUBRES, CP-UNRES, CP-RES
In CP-SUBRES and CP-RES, the following matrices are used:
Aℓ,u =


−1 −rℓ
−1 −ru
1 rℓ−1
1 ru+1
u− ℓ+ 1
∑u
i=ℓ ri

 , bℓ,u =


−cℓ
−cu
cℓ−1
cu+1
B

 ,
where r0 = rn+1 = 0, c0 = cn+1 = B.
Bℓ,u =


1 rℓ
1 ru
−1 −rℓ−1
−1 −ru+1
n− (u− ℓ+ 1)
∑ℓ
i=1 ri +
∑n
i=u ri

 , bℓ,u =


cℓ
cu
−cℓ−1
−cu+1
B

 ,
7It is one minus Bayes error rate, where the Bayes error rate is the lowest possible error rate over any classifier given random
labels from workers.
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Algorithm 2 CP-SUBRES
1: ℓ← 0
2: i←
⌊
ℓ+u
2
⌋
3: for k = 0, 1, ..., n do
4: u← k + 1
5: while i 6= ℓ||i 6= u− 1 do
6: if LP(Ai,k, bi,k) returns xi then
7: if xi = (p, q) satisfies the equality in (19) or (22) then
8: p← p− ǫ while not harming (20) and (21)
9: end if
10: u← i
11: else if LP(Ai,k, bi,k) returns Null then
12: ℓ← i
13: end if
14: i←
⌊
ℓ+u
2
⌋
15: end while
16: if LP(Ai.k, bi,k) returns Null then
17: xk ← LP (Au,k, bu,k)
18: end if
19: end for
20: return argmax{x0, ...,xn}
Algorithm 3 CP-UNRES
Require: n ≥ 0, ri ∈ [0, 1], ci ≥ 0, i ∈ [n]
1: Sort all workers by bang-per-buck so that r1
c1
≥ r2
c2
≥ ... ≥ rn
cn
2: k ← 0
3: while
∑k+1
i=1
ck
rk
(ri) ≤ B do
4: k ← k + 1
5: end while
6: return (0, ck
rk
)
Algorithm 4 CP-RES
1: for ℓ = 0, 1, ..., n do
2: u←
⌊
ℓ+n
2
⌋
3: while u 6= ℓ+ 1||u 6= n||ell 6= u do
4: if LP(Bℓ,u, dℓ,u) returns xℓ then
5: if xℓ = (p, q) satisfies the equality in 1st and 2nd row of Bi,k then
6: p← p− ǫ while not harming 3rd and 4th row of Bi,k
7: end if
8: u←
⌊
ℓ+u
2
⌋
9: else if LP(Bℓ,u, dℓ,u) returns Null then
10: u←
⌊
u+n
2
⌋
11: end if
12: end while
13: if LP(Bℓ,u, dℓ,u) returns Null then
14: xℓ ← LP (Bℓ,u+1, dℓ,u+1)
15: end if
16: end for
17: return argmax{x0, ...,xn}
xxiv
